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Becker and Murphy (1988) constructed, in a well-known paper, a model of rational addiction
in which people solve a dynamic optimization problem, choose an optimal timepath of drug
consumption and thereby maximize lifetime utility. The model leads to the hypothesis that
future consumption is a significant explanatory variable for present consumption. 
This paper briefly surveys the empirical studies which provide support for this hypothesis.
Most of the authors claim to have found support for the Becker-Murphy model. However, this
paper will show that it is possible to obtain qualitatively the same results for the consumption
patterns of myopic addicts. To this end, an economy is simulated in which everyone behaves
according to Pollak's (1970) paradigmatic alternative to the model of rational addiction
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I. Introduction
Do people maximize lifetime utility, even when (at least) one good is addictive? This is not an
easy question to answer, because the consumption of an addictive good, by its very nature,
changes either the next period's utility function, or it changes a variable which enters the
utility function
1. More formally, the task is to maximize
2 




⋅  σ (1)
where ct is the consumption of an addictive good in period t, yt the consumption of a vector of
non-addictive goods and St the stock of "addictive capital" built up by consuming c in earlier
periods. The paper follows the example of Becker and Murphy (1988) in calling those people
rational, who are aware of the addictive good's effect, and who succeed in maximizing V.
Addictive behaviour, as Becker and Murphy have shown, could be the solution to this
dynamic programming problem. More commonly, however, addicts are thought to be myopic.
They maximize utility in each period t as if it were their last, or as if drug consumption would
not change the next period's utility function.
Quite a few attempts have been made to test the hypothesis that addicts are rational against
the hypothesis that they are myopic. Almost all authors make use of a hypothesis which
Becker and Murphy derive from their model, namely: ct depends on the future consumption of
the addictive good. This is a unique feature of rational addiction, in the sense that only past
events and actions can enter the utility function for myopic addicts. Whereas this is clear in
theory, it is empirically difficult to show that changes in ct+1  cause changes in ct, as
                                                
     1 The latter is not different from a biological point of view; it is just a different formal representation in
accordance with Becker and Stigler (1977).
     2 The following is a discrete time variant of the original approach by Becker and Murphy (1988) as used, e.g.,3
correlations between these two variables can also be due to the fact that drug consumption in
one period might cause drug consumption to increase in the next period, which is a central
element of any reasonable model of addiction. And indeed, as will be shown below, any
researcher who regresses ct on ct+1 will find a significant impact of the latter in an economy
made up entirely of myopic (or backward-looking) drug consumers. Most authors are aware
of this problem and try to solve it with an instrumental variable approach: ct is regressed not
on ct+1, but on predicted values of ct+1, with pt+1 and sometimes lagged prices and other
explanatory variables used as instruments as well. Since pt+1 does not depend on ct
3, the
problem of endogeneity should be resolved. This paper aims to examine the simulated
economy of myopic individuals in greater detail in order to check whether the instrumental
variable approach really solves all problems under all conditions.
II. Myopic individuals
The people who inhabit our simulated economy constitute a special case of myopic
maximizers as modelled in Pollak's (1970) well-known paper. Pollak models habit formation
in the following way: bct is the absolutely necessary quantity of the addictive good in period t,
determined at least partly by past consumption
4:
c β    +    b    =    b 1 t- c
*
c ct ⋅
Pollak discusses various additive utility functions, wherein each good's utility depends on the
amount consumed minus the respective b; in the following, we confine ourselves to one
                                                                                                                                                        
by Chaloupka (1992).
     3 Keeler et al. (1993, p.15) doubt that this is true, because it is not realistic that the price should not be
determined by the process of supply and demand; they argue that, especially in the short run, supply curves can
be upward sloping. However, their solution to take use the actual value of ct+1 as a regressor is hardly more
convincing as a solution to the problem of endogeneity.
     4 The results are not markedly different if xit-1 is replaced by a geometrically weighted average of all past
consumptions (Pollak 1970, p.750).4
special case - essentially a Stone-Geary utility function with two goods and habit formation
for one of these:
) c   β   -   c (   a   +   ) b   -   y (   a   =   ) y   , c ( U
z
1 t- c t c
z *
y t t y t t t ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
with ay, ac ≥  0, 0 < z < 1, and the stability condition ßc < 1 being fulfilled. Let wt denote income
in t, py the vector of the normal good's price and pc the addictive good's price. Hence
individuals maximize Ut under the budget restriction
p    c   +   p    y   =   w c t y t t ⋅ ⋅
Lifetime utility (1) is, however, not maximized by individuals, as they disregard the effect of
ct on bt+1. 
It is assumed that 40 time periods (1, 2..., 40) are observed in our simulated economy, and in
each of these, 40 individuals consume the addictive good
5. However, as individuals are born
and die, the composition of the economy gradually changes, and a total of 79 individuals
(denoted individual i, with i = 1, 2, ..., 79) are involved. Individual i dies at the end of period i
and starts to consume at the beginning of the period (i-39) - for example, individual 79 begins
to consume at the beginning of period 40, whereas individual 1 begins to consume at the
beginning of period -38 and dies at the end of period 1. In period 1, the addictive good is
consumed by individuals 1 to 40, in period 2 by individuals 2 to 41, etc. We do not let the
consumption of all individuals start simultaneously in period 1, as all of them would become
addicted at the same time, producing an inherent time trend, which would not driven by the
independent variables.
If it is assumed that z = 0.5; then each individual's short-run demand function becomes:
                                                
     5 Under the assumptions made above, individuals start consuming the addictive good as soon as wt > by
*⋅ py.5
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(cf. Pollak, 1970). 
The following parameter values are set for the simulation: ß = 0.5; py = 1; ay = 1; by = 10;
w  =  1000 in all periods and for all individuals. In order to create some noise, ac differs
between individuals; this parameter is randomly determined, with 0<ac≤ 1. Nine different price
time series are tried out (see Figure 1).
The time series are partly artificially generated, and are partly based on real price time series;
see the bottom of Table 1 for details. 
For each of the time series, the behaviour - and the finally aggregated consumption of the
addictive good – of the myopic individuals is generated over 40 periods. The next section
reports what happens when previous research methods are applied to these sets of data. 6
























































Norwegian beer: real price index of beer in Norway, 1960-1994, for periods 1 to 35 and
remaining at the same level as that in period 35 in periods 36 to 40 (source: Bentzen, Eriksson
and Smith, 1999)
U.S. cpi: U.S. consumer price index 1927-1966
German cpi: German consumer price index, 1960-1999
shortwave: price = 100 + 50⋅ sin[45⋅ (t-1)], with t denoting the period
longwave: price = 100 + 50⋅ sin[9⋅ (t-1)]
exponential: price = 99 + exp(t/8)
tax: price remaining constant at 100 until period 5, then a 10% price increase every 10 periods
assumed to be induced by tax changes
random: a discrete random variable, with price ~ Un(50,150)
markov: a random walk, starting at 100 at period 1, then adding either 1, 0 or -1, each with
probability 1/3, in each period.7
III. Previous research methods applied to simulated data
The simplest attempt to test the key prediction of the rational addiction theory is to simply
regress ct on ct+1:
etc. ....    +   c     +   c     +   p     +     =   c 1 t+ 3 1 t- 2 t 1 0 t ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ α α α α (2)
The "etc." stands for various specific control variables such as the introduction of health
warnings or restrictions on advertising, which are of no interest here. In the above equation, the
problem of endogeneity is fairly obvious, as by the very nature of addiction – whether consumers
are rational or not – ct+1 depends on ct. Hence most authors who estimate (2) do so only for the
purpose of comparison with the more sophisticated approaches described below [Cameron 1999,
Fem/Antonelli/Schroeter 2001, Grossman/Chaloupka 1998, Grossman/Chaloupka/Sirtalan 1998,
Liu/Liu/Hammitt/Chou 1999]. However, Cameron (1997), Keeler/Hu/Barnett/Manning (1993)
and Labeaga (1999), content themselves with the above approach in their studies on cigarette
demand, and all of them – not surprisingly – find results which they interpret as support for the
rational addiction model. The same results are obtained by estimating (2) for our economy of
myopic addicts with any of the eight price time series, see Table 1. For example, taking the price
time series "Norwegian beer", equation (2) is estimated as follows
6:
Ct = 0.1793 - 0.0033 Pt + 0.5655 Ct-1 + 0.5018 Ct+1   R² = 0.9697
         (1.33) (-2.84)       (10.71)    (10.06)
Hence the results from estimating (2) support both the hypothesis that consumers are myopic and
the rational addiction theory.
                                                
   
6 t-statistics in parentheses. Detailed results for the other eight price time series are available upon request.
Different runs of the simulation lead to slightly different results, as one parameter in the utility functions (ac) is
randomly determined. However, the results given here are representative in the sense that further runs lead to8
Table 1: Support for the rational addiction model when consumers are myopic
eq. (2), OLS






Norwegian beer + + +




German cpi + + +
Exponential +
Longwave + -
tax  + - +
   a: + means that the coefficient for ct+1 is significantly larger than 0
   b: + means that the coefficient for 
∧
C t+1 is significantly larger than 0; - means that it is
significantly smaller than 0
An obvious way of overcoming the problem of endogeneity is to find exogenous instruments for
predicting future consumption. The future price pt+1, often together with lagged prices, is used to
obtain the predicted future consumption of the addictive good,  1 t c +
∧
, which is then used as a
regressor: 
etc. ....    +    c ˆ     +   c     +   p     +     =   c 1 t+ 3 1 t- 2 t 1 0 t ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ α α α α (3)
For this regression equation, a positive and significant coefficient for  1 t c +
∧
, interpreted as
support for the rational addiction model, is found for a number of goods: cigarettes
                                                                                                                                                        
coefficients with the same signs and the same dimension of significance for this equation as well as for the
following ones; again, details are available upon request.9
(Becker/Grossman/Murphy 1994, Escario/Molina 2001, Fem/Antonelli/Schroeter 2001,
Sung/Hu/Keeler 1994), alcohol (Grossman/Chaloupka/Sirtalan 1998, Bask/Melkersson 2001,
Bentzen/Eriksson/Smith 1999, the latter in separate equations for beer, wine and spirits) and
cocaine (Grossman/Chaloupka 1998).
Five studies in which (3) is estimated, however, do not find any support for the rational addiction
theory: Cameron (1999) for cinema attendance, Coniffe (1995) for tobacco, Bask/Melkersson
(2001) for cigarettes, Bretteville-Jensen/Biørn (2001) for heroin and Liu/Liu/Hammitt/Chou
(1999) for opium. 
The results for estimating (3) for the simulated economy of myopic addicts depend on the price
time series used, see Table 1. For example, with the price time series "Norwegian beer", the
economy of myopic addicts behaves like one of rational addicts:
Ct = -2.8653 - 0.0296 Pt + 1.0904 Ct-1 + 1.9600 
∧
C t+1   R² = 0.9685
           (-7.64) (-10.48)           (30.85)       (9.82)
The same holds for one more price time series (German cpi), but not for the other seven.
Whether econometricians investigating the rational addiction model would draw wrong
conclusions for the economy of myopics depends on the price time series used. However, there is
nothing which seems to distinguish the price time series "Norwegian beer" and "German cpi"
from "U.S. cpi" etc. (see Figure 1), and as far as the author is aware, nothing in econometrics
allows us to predict which price time series are susceptible to this phenomenon.
Another perplexing phenomenon occurs when pt+1 is used as a regressor. As a starting point, one
might consider replacing  1 t c +
∧
 by pt+1 in the regression equation as an alternative way to
overcome the problem of endogeneity; however, to the author’s knowledge, only one attempt to
do so has been made, namely in the working paper Becker/Grossman/Murphy (1990), which was10
finally published in 1994 without this equation. The joint inclusion of pt+1 and  1 t c +
∧
 in the
regression equation is more popular: 
etc. .... +   p     +   c ˆ     +   c     +   p     +     =   c 1 t+ 4 1 t+ 3 1 t- 2 t 1 0 t ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ α α α α α (4)
The following authors made claims to have found support for the rational addiction theory based
on estimates of this equation: Chaloupka (1990, 1991, 1992) for cigarettes, Labeaga (1993) for
tobacco, Olekalns/Bardsley (1996) for coffee and Waters/Sloan (1995) for alcohol. In our
simulated economy of myopic addicts, the results for estimating (4) are similar to those for
estimating (3) with the "Norwegian beer" price time series:
Ct = -3.0251 - 0.03517 Pt + 1.0666 Ct-1 + 2.0318 
∧
C t+1 + 0.0056 Pt+1     R² = 0.9712
          (-3.03) (-8.33)           (28.83)        (10.24)          (1.73)
However, for one price time series ("tax"), the coefficient of 
∧
C t+1 was significantly positive
when (3) was estimated, and it is significantly negative when (4) is estimated, i.e., after
inclusion of Pt+1 in the regression equation! 
IV. Discussion
A practical conclusion can be immediately drawn from the last observation in the previous
section: it would be desirable to have both estimates of (3) and (4) at the same time (from the
same data set); this is not provided by any of the papers referred to above. 
More importantly, even if this were to yield the desired coefficients in both cases
7, this would
not form conclusive evidence for the rational addiction model. This problem was overlooked
up until recently, when Gruber and Köszegi (2001) showed that the evidence provided so far
                                                
   
7 Like in the case of the price time series "Norwegian beer" in our simulation.11
is compatible with non-rational - yet forward-looking - behaviour
8. This paper goes further by
demonstrating that under certain conditions, even an economy of definitely myopic
consumers might behave in accordance with empirical predictions of the rational addiction
model. Admittedly, this is not always the case (not for seven out of nine different price time
series), and so one might argue that even if one single econometric study might not prove
much, the bulk of evidence going back to 1990 would be more convincing, as it applies to
many different addictive substances, time spans and countries. However, as the survey above
has shown, not all of this empirical evidence points in the same direction, as some studies fail
to find a significant impact of future consumption on current consumption. This is even more
remarkable as it is reasonable to presume that following the publication of Becker and
Murphy (1988) there was a publication bias
9 in favour of evidence supporting the new
approach. 
More convincing evidence disputing the hypothesis of the entirely myopic behaviour of
addicts could possibly be obtained from new empirical strategies, like the regression of (legal)
drug consumption on future price changes, disregarding future consumption, as in Gruber and
Köszegi (2001), or advanced panel econometric methods, as in Baltagi and Griffin (1999).
The evaluation of these approaches must be left to future research.
                                                
   
8 For another criticism of prevailing approaches see Ferguson (2000), who shows that the estimates of Olekalns
and Bardsley (1996) implicitly predict a fifty thousand percent increase in U.S. coffee consumption within 20
years. Fehr and Zych (1998) demonstrate experimentally that even in the sober atmosphere of a laboratory and
even with learning, people are not able to solve dynamic optimization problems like the one posed by equation
(1).
   
9 On the problem of the publication bias see Sterling (1959) and Tullock (1959).12
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